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Abstract
Refugee camps are often managed by a wide set of actors other than the Host State. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr), tasked under interna-
tional law to provide “international protection” to refugees and to seek “permanent 
solutions for the problem of refugees”, often sub-contracts the daily management of 
camps to non-governmental organizations (ngo). In 2013, unhcr collaborated with 
733 ngos worldwide. Together with unhcr, these “implementing partners” often per-
form public powers normally exercised by the Host State. But when human rights viola-
tions occur following the conduct of a unhcr implementing partner, which actor(s) are 
responsible under international law? This article focuses on unhcr’s international 
responsibility for the conduct of ngo implementing partners. By exploring unhcr’s 
standard sub-contracting agreements through the lens of the International Law 
Commission’s (ilc) Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ario), 
it answers questions such as: Which human rights requirements does unhcr place on 
implementing partners? Under what circumstances may unhcr be held responsible 
under the ario for the acts of its implementing partners? It finds that an application of 
the ario would make unhcr internationally responsible for the wrongful conduct of 
implementing partners, even when sub-contracting agreements include clauses absolving 
unhcr from any liability.
* The author is grateful for comments on previous drafts by the anonymous reviewers.
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1 See Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr Statute), 
adopted by the un General Assembly in ga Res 428, 14 December 1950, para. 1.
2 These actors include governments and their agencies, United Nations sister agencies, inter-
national organizations and non-governmental organizations. This article deals primarily 
with unhcr’s non-governmental implementing partners, and does not as such address 
situations where State agencies are unhcr implementing partners. See unhcr, ‘ngo 
Partnerships in Refugee Protection, Questions & Answers’ unhcr/ derngo/ Q&aa5 / eng 
3, September 2007; T. Börzel and T. Risse, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and 
Legitimate Tools of Transitional Governance’, in E. Grande and L.W. Pauly (eds.), Complex 
Sovereignty, Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century 195 (2005), at 201.
3 M. Janmyr, Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps: Unwilling and Unable States, unhcr and 
International Responsibility (2014).
4 For a thorough elaboration of non-governmental organizations in international law, see 
A-K. Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law (2005).
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 Introduction
The refugee camp may be considered an anomalous establishment, being situ-
ated on the territory of a Host State but in practice often managed by a wide 
range of actors other than State authorities. Under international law, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) is specifically 
tasked to provide “international protection” to refugees and to seek “perma-
nent solutions for the problem of refugees”.1 In fulfilling its mandate in general, 
and administering refugee camps in particular, unhcr relies to a large extent 
on partnerships with a wide spectrum of actors.2 While unhcr’s relation to 
the Host State in the context of international responsibility has been dealt 
with elsewhere,3 this article focuses on the Organization’s so-called “imple-
menting partnerships”, where unhcr, through a formal project agreement, 
sub-contracts certain tasks to a non-governmental organization (ngo).4 In 
2013, unhcr collaborated with 733 ngos worldwide, and many of these are an 
intricate part of the power structure of refugee camps. Together with unhcr 
they varyingly perform all or some of the public powers normally exercised by 
the Host State. Typically, unhcr negotiates conditions with government 
authorities, approves the campsite, and functions as a supervisor or perfor-
mance evaluator. The ngo sub-contractors are hired to manage the camp and 
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5 O.E. Olsen and K.S. Scharffscher, ‘Rape in Refugee Camps as Organisational Failures’, 8 
International Journal of Human Rights 377 (2004), at 387. See also un Secretary-General, 
Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa: Note by 
the Secretary-General, A/57/465, 11 October 2002, at 12.
6 Agier, for instance, describes how in the Zambian Maheba camp, unhcr had delegated its 
powers to the national section of the Lutheran World Foundation, which in turn deployed 
agents who were Zambian nationals and refugees. See M. Agier, Managing the Undesirables: 
Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (2011), at 82. See also un Secretary-General, 
supra note 5, at 4.
7 Lindblom, supra note 4, at 525.
8 See generally unhcr and Save the Children, ‘Note for Implementing an Operational Partners 
on Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experiences of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone: Based on Initial Findings and Recommendations from Assessment Mission 
22 Oct.–30 Nov. 2001’, 27 February 2002. See also un Secretary-General, supra note 5. The lack 
of oversight of unhcr and ngos with regard to serious human rights issues has also been 
explored in Human Rights Watch, ‘Trapped by Inequality: Bhutanese Refugee Women in 
Nepal’, Vol. 15, No. 8(C), September, 2003.
9 G. Verdirame and B. Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile: Janus-faced Humanitarianism (2005), 
at 137–138.
provide for the necessary food, health facilities, water/sanitation, schools, 
security and other essential services.5 In other words, these ngos are charged 
by unhcr with carrying out unhcr functions. They may also delegate to yet 
another set of actors, such as to the refugees themselves.6
While ngos may have an important role to play when it comes to refugee 
protection, it is often pointed out that they are seldom accountable to the peo-
ple on whose behalf they claim to speak.7 The increasing delegation of author-
ity often brings about a number of human rights concerns — indeed, the 
behavior of unhcr personnel and implementing partners hit the headlines in 
the early 2000s when a widely-publicized scandal unfolded in Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone.8 A report by unhcr and Save the Children concluded that 
there was compelling evidence of a “chronic and entrenched pattern” of abuse 
in refugee camps in the three West African countries, involving mostly locally 
employed workers for international ngos. During the same time period, 
InterAid, a unhcr implementing partner in Uganda, was reported to have 
directed police to use excessive force against refugees on numerous occasions. 
As specifically asserted by Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, the “inhuman treat-
ment accorded to refugees waiting for their asylum cases to be heard or to 
receive services at the offices of unhcr or their implementing partners has 
been so widely reported that it can be described as normative.”9 On other occa-
sions, abuse has not been perpetrated by unhcr implementing partners, but 
these have omitted to take steps to prevent human rights violations from 
occurring. In Roma camps for internally displaced persons in Mitrovica, 
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10 See specifically Complaint, ‘129 Roma in Kosovo v. Norwegian Church Aid’, 22 June 2011, 
at 10ff, http://www.responsiblebusiness.no/files/2013/12/roma_klage.pdf (last accessed 
26 October 2014). See also Council of Europe, Report of the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights: Special Mission to Kosovo, 23–27 March 2009, 
Commdh(200) 23, 2 July 2009, at 23ff; M.J. Brown et al., ‘Lead Poisoning Among Internally 
Displaced Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Children in the United Nations-Administered 
Province of Kosovo’, 20 European Journal of Public Health 288 (2010); ‘un Closes 
Controversial Lead-Contaminated idp Site in Kosovo’, irin News, 8 October 2010; Human 
Rights Watch, Poisoned by Lead: A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Mitrovica’s Roma 
Camps, 1-56432-498-2, June 2009.
11 Council of Europe, supra note 10, at 25.
12 Rather, the legal status of ngos consists of the rights and capacities which are expressly 
conferred to them, and can as such not be inferred from a more general recognition 
of their status. For a more general discussion on the responsibility of ngos, see e.g. 
Lindblom, ‘The Responsibility of Other Entities: Non-Governmental Organisations’ 
and C. Tomuschat, ‘The Responsibility of Other Entities: Private Individuals’, both in 
J. Crawford et al. (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (2010).
13 ilc, Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, A/CN.4/L.778, 30 May 
2011 (ario).
Kosovo, set up by unhcr when Kosovo was under un administration, the 
Norwegian Church Aid (nca) ostensibly did little to prevent exposure to 
serious and lethal health risks due to detrimental conditions in the camp that 
it managed.10 Several studies by the World Health Organization (who) and 
others have found that the communities were affected by extremely high levels 
of lead contamination, especially children who were found to have lead blood 
levels which amounted to a medical emergency.11
In view of these realities, and in terms of achieving justice for victims of 
human rights violations in refugee camps, it is important that we address the 
allocation of responsibility for human rights violations taking place in these 
spaces. While international law has increasingly recognized that both States 
and international organizations are subjects of international law and can thus 
be held responsible under the law of international responsibility, the same is 
not entirely true when it comes to ngos. Here, the traditional view stresses 
that ngos are not subjects of international law, and cannot therefore in a strict 
sense have international obligations and thus engage with the international 
laws of responsibility.12 This article aims to address this very problematic issue 
area by focusing on unhcr’s international responsibility for the conduct of 
its ngo implementing partners. Through an exploration of unhcr’s stan-
dard  agreements with its implementing partners as well as the Interna-
tional Law Commission’s (ilc) Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (ario),13 adopted in the summer of 2011, this article aims to 
answer questions such as: which human rights requirements, if any, does 
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14 Janmyr, supra note 3.
15 See e.g. the Humanitarian Accountability Project, http://www.hapinternational.org/  
(last accessed 26 October 2014).
unhcr place on its implementing partners? When human rights violations 
occur following the conduct of a unhcr implementing partner, who shall be 
held liable under international law? Under what circumstances may unhcr 
be held responsible under the ario for the acts of its implementing partners? 
In addressing these queries, this article builds upon earlier work on the inter-
national responsibility of unhcr,14 but does not address other potential ave-
nues of accountability for the actions of ngos outside that of the rules of 
international responsibility. Any independent liability of the ngo thus falls 
outside the scope of this article but may indeed be triggered in the domestic 
legal arena or by recourse to non-legal avenues such as various humanitarian 
accountability projects.15
This article begins with an overview of the nature and scope of unhcr’s 
implementing partnerships, before explaining the general procedure of 
unhcr’s delegation of functions. It thereafter explores unhcr’s standard 
Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement, which is typically the most important legal 
instrument setting out the obligations of the implementing ngo in any given 
situation. The article’s third section analyzes the Agreement in light of the 
ilc’s Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, paying par-
ticular attention to the question of whether or not these ngos can be consid-
ered to be unhcr “agents”, and whether they do, in fact, perform unhcr 
“functions”. Concluding that unhcr may indeed be held responsible under 
the ario for the conduct of its implementing partners, even when an 
Agreement includes clauses aimed at absolving unhcr from any responsibil-
ity whatsoever, in its final section, this article sets out a few recommendations 
aimed at clarifying the relations between unhcr and its implementing 
partners.
1 Perspectives on Implementing Partnerships
unhcr has been working with ngos ever since it first began assisting dis-
placed persons in Europe following the end of World War ii, when it cooper-
ated with about 100 national and international “voluntary societies”. From a 
unhcr point of view, there are a number of benefits to sub-contracting ngos 
to perform specific tasks in refugee camps. ngos are perceived as vital to the 
successful conduct of unhcr’s programs, and as the Organization has pointed 
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16 unhcr, Report on unhcr's Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations 
(PARinAC), EC/47/SC/CRP.52, 15 August 1997, at para. 3. See also unhcr, supra note 2, 
at 6; unhcr Executive Committee, Annual Theme: Strengthening Partnership to Ensure 
Protection, also in Relation to Security, A/ac.96/923, 14 September 1999), at para. 7.
17 unhcr, Handbook for Emergencies (2007), at 116, para. 2; unhcr, Enhancing unhcr’s 
Capacity to Monitor the Protection, Rights and Well-Being of Refugees: Synthesis of 
Findings and Recommendations, epau/2004/06, 1 June 2004, at ch. 6, para. 3.
18 unhcr Executive Committee, supra note 16, at para. 23.
19 unhcr, Report on the Meeting with Non-Governmental Organizations prior to the 
Fifty-second Session of the Executive Committee of unhcr (24–26 Sept. 2001), October 
2001, at 3.
20 Statement by Representative of the International Rescue Committee, in unhcr, supra 
note 19, at 4.
21 unhcr’s implementing partners have however increasingly voiced their concerns regard-
ing staff security in projects initiated by unhcr. See R. Martin, A More Proactive un Role 
in the Security of ngo Staff?, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 45 (2001).
22 Ibid.
out, “[t]here is virtually no area of unhcr’s work which does not involve 
collaboration with ngos.”16 Indeed, direct implementation by unhcr should 
only, according to unhcr, occur in exceptional circumstances, such as 
when “there is no viable implementing partner”.17 ngos are further seen 
as “efficient and flexible”, and their “relatively less bureaucratic structures 
enable them to act with speed and adapt rapidly to changing situations in the 
field”.18 Given the sub-contracting ngos’ extensive presence in the field, it 
has also been argued that ngos are often in a better position to discover 
and analyze protection-related problems.19 In Albania, for instance, unhcr 
“removed” armed elements from a refugee camp following their discovery 
by local ngos.20 The activities of ngos in insecure areas may furthermore 
not be restricted to the same extent as those of unhcr, which, being part of 
the un, is subject to rigid security constraints. unhcr’s implementing part-
ners may as such have a unique access to refugee camps in insecure areas that 
may otherwise be inaccessible to unhcr staff.21 In Uganda, for instance, 
unhcr personnel were in the early 2000s reluctant to visit refugee camps 
in the volatile north and unhcr thus attracted criticism for its expectation 
that ngos carry out services in these camps on a daily basis. As Martin has 
argued, “[i]f ngos were to follow unhcr’s lead on security, there would simply 
be no services.”22
unhcr’s motivation for the use of implementing partners is also often 
argued in cost-efficiency terms. The success of the surge (Supporting unhcr 
Resources on the Ground with Experts on mission) Capacity Project, for 
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23 See European Commission, Evaluation of the partnership between echo and unhcr 
and of unhcr activities funded by echo, echo/adm/bud/2004/01212, October 2005, 
at 6; 36.
24 See unhcr, surge, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16a15b6.html (last accessed 7 July 
2014); unhcr, The Protection Surge Capacity Project, Answers to Frequently Asked 
Questions for surge Roster Applicants and Members, http://www.unhcr.org/42c943cf2 
.html (last accessed 7 July 2014). Similarly, the Danish Refugee Council, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council, and Save the Children have developed emergency response and standby 
agreements with unhcr to facilitate the rapid deployment in for instance refugee protec-
tion, child protection and field security. See unhcr, supra note 2, at 17.
25 unhcr, surge, ibid.
26 European Commission, supra note 23.
27 Institutions who do not receive funding from unhcr but who play a major role in refugee 
operations are known as “operational partners”. They are not dealt with in this article. 
See unhcr, Partnerships in Protection, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2c0.html 
(last accessed 7 July 2014).
28 unhcr, supra note 2.
29 Ibid. at 9.
30 The PARinAC Global ngo and unhcr Conference included 182 ngo representatives 
from 83 countries, as well as observers from intergovernmental bodies, the United Nations 
system, agencies and members of Executive Committee. The conference, which took 
place in Oslo, Norway, from 6–9 June 1994, adopted by consensus the Oslo Declaration 
and Plan of Action, which endorses the regional proposals from all the consultations. 
instance, stems from the fact that it enables unhcr to hire protection staff 
“at a fraction of the cost of a un staff member”.23 In the surge project the 
International Rescue Committee (irc) recruits, trains and deploys protection 
officers to unhcr field offices when there are increased protection needs and 
limited unhcr staff.24 ngo staff are seconded to unhcr to perform various 
protection activities such as monitoring refugee returns and child protection, 
but areas of intervention for surge Protection Officers also include the physi-
cal security of refugees, arrest and detention, and border monitoring.25 Thus, 
ngo staff often “‘do not hesitate to go deep in the field’ at less costly salary scales 
compared to unhcr regular staff […].”26
The numbers of unhcr implementing and operational partners have 
steadily risen over the years.27 In the mid-1960s, unhcr’s partners numbered 
less than 20, of which half were large international ngos.28 In response to 
major refugee emergencies in the Horn of Africa, Asia and Central America 
during the 1980s, this number rose significantly; for instance, in the late 
1980s, there were over 100 international ngos working in the Afghan refugee 
camps in Pakistan.29 During the 1990s, the High Commissioner called for 
a redoubling of unhcr’s partnerships, and subsequently launched the 
Partnership in Action (PARinAC) initiative in 1994.30 By 2004, unhcr had 
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The Plan of Action includes 134 recommendations that were intended to serve as guide-
lines for present and future response to humanitarian challenges. However, a 2010 inves-
tigation by the un Office for Internal Oversight criticized unhcr for the fact that the 
PARinAC had not been reviewed since 2000. See unhcr, supra note 2, at 4; unhcr, 
Partnership in Action (PARinAC): Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action, 9 June 1994; 
un Office of Internal Oversight (oios), Audit Report: unhcr’s Relationship with 
Implementing Partners (Audit Report, Implementing Partners), ar2007/160/03, 25 March 
2010, at 9; unhcr, ‘Report on PARinAC and Plan of Action 2000’, February 2000.
31 unhcr, Enhancing unhcr’s Capacity, supra note 17, at ch. 2, para. 17; R. Zetter, 
‘International Perspectives on Refugee Assistance’, in A. Ager (ed.), Refugees: Perspectives 
on the Experience of Forced Migration 46 (1999); unhcr, supra note 2, at 4.
32 unhcr, supra note 2, at 7; 13.
33 unhcr, Global Report 2013 – Working in partnership, http://www.unhcr.org/539809d916 
.html (last accessed 10 July 2014), at 84.
34 F. Groot, Evaluation of unhcr Training Activities for Implementing Partners and 
Government Counterparts, epau/2000/02, September 2000, at 13; un oios, supra note 30, 
at 8.
35 unhcr, supra note 33, at 84.
36 un oios, supra note 30, at 2.
37 Groot, supra note 34, at 16.
38 un oios, Audit Report, unhcr Operations in Uganda, AR2008/112/02, 28 May 2009, at 15.
formal project agreements with over 500 ngos, of which 80 percent were local 
or national organizations.31 In 2007, this number had been significantly aug-
mented to include project agreements with 649 ngos, of which 75 percent 
were local or national ngos.32 In 2013, unhcr collaborated with 733 ngos 
worldwide, of which 567 were national and local ngos and 166 were 
international.33
For a long period, unhcr channeled approximately half of its raised funds 
through its implementing partners, but in 2009, approximately 35 percent of 
unhcr’s expenditures were spent through all partners.34 In 2013, unhcr 
funding channeled through ngos and other partners reached a record high, 
exceeding usd 1.15 billion, a 23 percent increase compared to 2012.35 The use of 
implementing partners is as such not only an integrated part of almost all 
unhcr activities, but administering and managing partnership agreements 
remains a major administrative and operational task for many unhcr  
representations.36 In fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number of sub-
agreements concluded each year between unhcr and its implementing part-
ners and government partners ranged between 1,300 and 1,400.37 In Uganda in 
2008 alone, unhcr administered 58 sub-agreements, a situation which 
attracted criticism from the un Office of Internal Oversight, precisely for being 
“difficult to manage”.38
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39 See D. Sarooshi, The United Nations And The Development Of Collective Security, The 
Delegation By The un Security Council of its Chapter vii Powers (1999); unhcr, Partnership: 
An Operations Management Handbook for unhcr’s Partners (2009), at 30; 89.
40 See Articles 10 and 12 of the unhcr Statute, supra note 1.
41 L.W. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time: The work of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 1951–1972 (1975), Vol. 1 at 88–9. See also unhcr, supra  
note 39, at 9.
42 This interpretation is also supported by Väyrynen, who argues that “[…] originally, the 
High Commissioner was primarily supposed to be a foundation that would collect and 
redistribute funds to organizations, mostly private ones, working with the refugees in the 
field”. See R. Väyrynen, ‘Funding Dilemmas in Refugee Assistance: Political Interests and 
Institutional Reforms in unhcr’, 35 International Migration Review 134 (2001), at 150.
2 Delegating Functions to Implementing Partners
A unhcr’s Competence to Delegate Functions
To be able to delegate its powers, unhcr must possess either the express or 
implied competence to do so.39 unhcr possesses a competence to delegate 
certain functions to its non-governmental implementing partners deriving 
from its mandate as expressed in the unhcr Statute.40 In stark contrast to 
unhcr’s predecessor, the International Refugee Organization (iro), unhcr 
was at the outset intended to be essentially non-operational.41 The idea of sub-
contracting certain functions to other actors is as such an important aspect of 
unhcr’s intended operation. Articles 10 and 12 of the Statute specifically 
establish the basis for these implementing partnerships. According to Article 
10 of the Statute, the High Commissioner “[…] shall administer any funds, pub-
lic or private, which he receives for assistance to refugees, and shall distribute 
them among the private and, as appropriate, public agencies which he deems 
best qualified to administer such assistance”. As such, the Statute has expressly 
opened for international assistance to be channeled through international and 
national ngos to the refugees under unhcr’s mandate.42
Article 12 of unhcr’s Statute also authorizes the High Commissioner to 
invite the “cooperation” of the “specialized agencies”. The term “cooperation” 
which is referenced to in Article 12, seems to be understood, at least by unhcr’s 
Executive Committee, to correspond with the notion of “partnership”:
Partnership is at the foundation of the way international protection is 
envisaged in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and in unhcr’s 
Mandate. Key provisions of both acknowledge that the effective perfor-
mance of unhcr’s functions depends on its cooperation with states, 
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43 unhcr Executive Commitee, supra note 16, paras. 7;12. See also unhcr Executive 
Committee Conclusion no. 87 (1999) sub. (g) in which the Executive Committee reaffirms 
Conclusion no. 85 (1985) sub. (d) and “calls on all interested parties to turn concentrated 
attention towards revitalizing old partnerships and building new ones in support of the 
international refugee protection system […]”
44 See M. Zieck, unhcr’s Worldwide Presence in the Field: A Legal Analysis of unhcr’s 
Cooperation Agreements (2006), at 71–2.
45 unhcr, supra note 39, at 30.
46 Ibid., at 89, paras. 1.3; 1.4; 2.1; 2.5.
47 Ibid., at 89–91, paras. 1.1; 3.1; 4.1.
intergovernmental organizations, private organizations and other 
entities.43
This would essentially mean that any agreement that unhcr enters into with 
the view of forging a partnership that contributes to unhcr’s discharge of its 
functions, could be seen as a cooperation agreement.44 Partnership agreements 
in their very essence arguably constitute a form of cooperation as envisaged in 
the unhcr Statute.
B General Process of Delegation
In order to ascertain unhcr’s responsibility for the conduct of its implement-
ing partners, it is important to understand the process of delegation and con-
tractual relationship between unhcr and the ngo. unhcr has explicitly 
referred to the relationship with its implementing partners as one of delega-
tion, explaining how “[t]he delegation of the implementation of an assistance 
project is embodied in an implementing agreement […]”45 However, in the 
view of unhcr, the first instance of “delegation” generally occurs when unhcr 
headquarters in Geneva through a “Letter of Instruction” (loi) delegates the 
project implementation authority to a unhcr Representative in a Field 
Office.46 In certain situations an “Emergency Letter of Instruction” (eloi) may 
be issued instead of the usual loi, with the purpose of giving the unhcr 
Representative in a country where an emergency situation is evolving the 
immediate authority to enter into agreements with implementing partners. 
The responsibilities for unhcr’s implementing partners are defined in the 
appropriate implementing agreement, which provide the legal basis for the 
delegation of project implementation.
unhcr’s provision of international protection and material assistance in a 
Host State is generally organized in terms of “projects”, meaning a designated 
part of a protection or assistance program.47 A project generally consists of a 
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48 However, as unhcr points out, “[t]his letter is not an implementing instrument, but a 
temporary arrangement pending the preparation of a detailed budget and a formal Sub-
Project Agreement”. Emphasis in original. Ibid., at 91, para. 3.7.
49 Janmyr, supra note 3, at 263ff.
50 See discussion in Lindblom, supra note 4, at 492–4.
number of sub-projects, which are each implemented by a given partner. 
Thus, the legally binding “sub-project agreements”, generally either a “tripartite 
agreement” between unhcr, the refugee-hosting government and an imple-
menting partner, or a very similar “bipartite agreement” between either unhcr 
and the implementing partner or unhcr and the host government, are the 
most common form of agreements. A so-called “headquarters agreement” may 
also be drawn up in a situation where there is only one implementing partner 
for a project, as may an interim “Letter of Mutual Intent to Conclude an 
Agreement” in order to begin a sub-project immediately in situations of excep-
tional urgency during which formal sub-agreements may be delayed.48 In the 
below, I will explore the most common form of sub-project agreement, the 
“Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement”.
C The Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement
The most important instrument setting out the concrete obligations of unhcr 
and its implementing partners appears to be the “Tripartite Sub-Project 
Agreement”. This Agreement concerns unhcr, the implementing partner 
(“the Agency”) and the Host State (“the Government”) and generally sets out 
the nature of activities, as well as administrative and financial procedures 
related to the implementation of sub-projects. The relation between unhcr 
and the Host State when it comes to managing refugee camps has been thor-
oughly addressed elsewhere, but it is important to note also here that unhcr’s 
relation with the Host State is generally governed by specific “cooperation 
agreements” which set out the legal questions concerning the establishment of 
a representative presence in the territory of a State, as well as the more sub-
stantive issues of unhcr’s relations with States.49
The Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement is arguably to be considered an inter-
national contract. While an agreement that is concluded between parties who 
have no international legal personality, i.e. ngos, will not normally be gov-
erned by international law, it is arguable that agreements of which one party is 
a non-state entity can be governed by international law.50 When determining 
whether an agreement, one party of which is a non-state actor, is subject to 
international law, due regard must be made to the intentions of the States or 
international organizations. If an intention that the agreement be governed 
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51 C. Greenwood, ‘The Libyan Oil Arbitrations’, 53 byil 27 (1983), at 79; K. Hobér, Extinctive 
Prescription and Applicable Law in Interstate Arbitration (2001), at 93, 113.
52 For a discussion of the possibility that subjects of international law other than States can 
enter into treaties, see Janmyr, supra note 3, at 35–6.
53 The standard format Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement is annexed to unhcr, supra note 
40. See Appendix C1.
54 Articles 8.05 and 8.06 of the format Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement. Ibid.
55 Ibid. Art. 8.06.
by international law is expressed in the actual agreement, these agreements 
should, at least in principle, be governed by international law. The idea that the 
intention of the parties determines which law is to govern an agreement is 
further supported by the principle of party autonomy which allows the parties 
to choose any set of rules to serve as the basis for solving disputes.51 As we will 
see below, the clearly international character of the Agreement supports the 
notion that it is of an international nature, as would the inherent linkage 
between unhcr’s partnerships and its mandate as laid out in the unhcr 
Statute.
The Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement includes a preamble and a number of 
articles, as well as three annexes, which, as emphasized in the Preamble, 
should be considered an essential part of the Agreement.52 The Preamble fur-
thermore restates that the nature of unhcr’s participation in the sub-project 
is humanitarian and non-political.53 The Agreement establishes conditions 
such as financial and accountability requirements, and also unhcr rules and 
procedures. It employs legal lingua such as the terms “obligations”, “liability” 
and “arbitration”. According to the Agreement, all parties also agree that they 
“shall” carry out a number of activities. Although there is no explicit reference 
as to which legal system is to govern the Agreement, a number of articles 
make specific reference to both national and international law. Article 6.14, for 
instance, concerns the implementing agency’s compliance with the laws and 
regulations of its country of residence or operation. Moreover, as for the settle-
ment of disputes, the Agreement refers to the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (uncitral) Conciliation Rules54 and also states that 
the place of arbitration shall be Geneva and that:
If the Parties cannot agree on the selection of a single arbitrator, then 
they may appoint each one Arbitrator who shall choose the third 
Arbitrator. In the event of disagreement as to the nomination of the third 
arbitrator, the latter shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.55
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These factors suggest that the Agreement is legally binding under international 
law. Furthermore, Article 3 deals with the duration of the agreement, while 
Article 8.07.1 concerns the termination of the Agreement and stipulates that 
“[i]f the Agency refuses or fails to prosecute any work, or separable part thereof, 
or violates any term, condition or requirement of this Agreement, unhcr, in 
consultation with the Government, may terminate this Agreement in writing 
with immediate effect”. The Agreement also includes a clause on force 
majeure.56 The following sections will explore the extent to which the 
Agreement lays down human rights requirements and other obligations on the 
implementing partner.
1 Human Rights Requirements and Other Obligations
Article 6 of the Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement provides that the implement-
ing partner has a strict obligation to respect the laws of the country in which it 
is operating, and under Article 4 it shall further
[…] refrain from any conduct that that would adversely reflect on unhcr 
and the United Nations and shall not engage in any activity which is 
incompatible with the aims and objectives of the United Nations or the 
mandate of unhcr to ensure the protection of refugees and other per-
sons of concern to unhcr.57
The aims and objectives of the United Nations are nevertheless not entirely 
clear-cut, and it is a matter of controversy whether the “purposes” of the un as 
contained in Article 1 of the un Charter are meant to be legally binding, or if, 
as Wolfrum notes, the wording is “more appropriate for political objectives 
rather than for legally binding obligations.”58 While Article 55 of the Charter 
specifically binds the un as a whole to promote “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language or religion”, it is less clear exactly which 
human rights are encompassed within the obligation. The un’s perspective of 
the indivisibility of human rights might nevertheless suggest that all rights are 
to be encompassed.59
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The reference to the mandate of unhcr is, however, of the same generality, 
not the least because unhcr does not have a straightforward statement of its 
responsibilities.60 In addition to the non-exhaustive lists of functions provided 
in the unhcr Statute, the Organization is also bound by a number of implied 
duties, which are likely to be incredibly difficult for unhcr’s implementing 
partners to keep track of.61 It is thus questionable whether the existence of a 
reference to the aims and purposes of the un Charter, and to the mandate of 
unhcr, is sufficient to demonstrate the meaningful existence of any human 
rights obligations, or, as in the above idea of Wolfrum, whether this Article is 
more to be considered a general statement of goals. While additional refer-
ences to more explicit human rights norms and instruments may not be neces-
sary as a means of creating human rights obligations in the first place, such 
additional articles would be beneficial for the sake of clarity.
Appendix 2 contains the “Standards of Conduct Ensuring Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse”, under which the implementing partner shall 
prevent, oppose and combat all exploitation and abuse of refugees and other 
persons of concern to unhcr.62 These standards were adopted in the wake 
of concern raised over the previously mentioned widely-publicized sexual 
exploitation by ngos of refugees in West African refugee camps during 2002, 
and are as such the most detailed human rights norms provided in the 
Agreement. While the Standards are not intended to be an exhaustive list, they 
inter alia stipulate that “sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel working 
on Projects/sub-Projects funded by unhcr, constitute acts of serious miscon-
duct and are therefore grounds for disciplinary measures, including summary 
dismissal”, and also prohibit sexual activity with children and the exchange of 
money, employment, goods or services for sex. Importantly, the implementing 
partner is under an explicit obligation to inform its staff of these principles.
Oddly situated under the heading “Financial and Programme Arrangements” 
in an Annex to the main agreement, we find an express obligation for unhcr’s 
implementing partners to abide by unhcr’s soft law material:
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In the implementation of unhcr Sub-Projects, the Governments and 
Agencies are required to respect the relevant Guidelines related to the 
protection of, and assistance to, refugees. Particularly relevant in this 
regard are the Global Strategic Priorities (see unhcr’s website at www 
.unhcr.org). The same website on the Refworld, Partnership Guides and 
Who We Help pages provides a range of information related to unhcr’s 
principles and policies: Age, Gender, and Diversity Mainstreaming (agd), 
refugee women/gender equality; refugee children & adolescents, older 
refugees, persons of concerns with disabilities, livelihood, environment 
and hiv/aids etc.63
The responsibilities placed on unhcr’s implementing partners thus seem to 
include a very general obligation to respect unhcr’s principles and policies. 
unhcr guidelines and handbooks are arguably one of the most influential 
means for unhcr to contribute to the development of international law, and 
may moreover be used to reaffirm or further elaborate previously accepted 
general or vague norms found in binding or non-binding texts.64 However, a 
wide-ranging reference to an obligation on the part of the implementing part-
ners to respect unhcr’s policies and procedures appears limited when it 
comes to constituting any meaningful human rights requirements, and par-
ticularly so in light of studies suggesting that both unhcr and implementing 
partner staff in the field have been unaware of unhcr’s protection guidelines 
and policies.65 Despite the fact that there has been a proliferation of guidelines 
and a considerable increase in attention to, for example, gender-based vio-
lence in the last decade, as one recent study pinpointed, “[t]he excellent guide-
lines and materials produced are often left unread by those working most 
closely with the refugee communities and are seldom used to inform and 
shape programmatic responses.”66 In situations where these relatively easily 
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accessible and comprehensible guidelines are disregarded in practice, it is 
indeed questionable to what extent the broader references as made in Article 6 
of the Agreement relating to un aims and objectives and unhcr’s mandate — 
both under constant evolvement and interpretation — actually translate into 
meaningful protection. In addition, Annex A provides no further evidence of 
an obligation to respect more generally applicable instruments of interna-
tional law, such as the un Charter or the core human rights conventions.
While it employs legal terminology in many other aspects, the Agreement 
thus avoids explicit human rights language. By comparison, the non-binding 
“Framework Agreement for Operational Partnership”,67 not applicable to 
unhcr’s implementing partners under the Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement, 
reiterates unhcr’s responsibility for “providing international protection, 
under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees” and for “[…] seeking 
permanent solutions for the problems of refugees by assisting Governments 
and, subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, private Organi-
zations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimi-
lation within new national communities”. It also stresses that “unhcr is bound 
by its Mandate and is required to provide protection to refugees, and as a part 
of its protection activities to coordinate and monitor the assistance provided.”68 
This Framework Agreement moreover includes a provision concerning non-
binding code of conducts, stating that “the Partners will be guided by the prin-
ciples set down in the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations”.69 The differences 
between these two agreements in the field of human rights appear manifest.
2 Responsibility and Accountability Issues
Several clauses of unhcr’s Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement aim at absolv-
ing unhcr from responsibility for the conduct of its implementing partners 
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when these perform services for unhcr. Article 4, a key provision, specifically 
states that:
unhcr does not accept any liability for claims arising out of the activi-
ties performed under this Agreement, or any claims for death, bodily 
injury, disability, damage to property or other hazards that may be suf-
fered by Agency or Government Personnel as a result of their work per-
taining to the Sub-Project.70
Importantly, under the Agreement, it is the implementing partner and the 
Host State that are responsible for dealing with all claims brought against 
either of them by implementing partner or Host State.71 unhcr is not liable to 
indemnify any third party in respect of any claim, debt, damage or demand 
arising out of the implementation of the Sub-Project — to the contrary, the 
Agreement stipulates that it is the implementing partner and the Host State 
who are responsible for dealing with all claims arising out of the acts or omis-
sions of the personnel of the implementing partner or the Host State, even 
when these claims are made against unhcr and its officials or persons per-
forming services for unhcr. Article 6, concerning assignment and sub- 
contracting, equally provides that the implementing partner shall be “[…] fully 
responsible for all work and services performed by operational partners, sub-
contractors and suppliers, and for all acts and omissions committed by them or 
their employees”. Article 6.13 also stipulates that the agency shall be fully respon-
sible for all services performed by agency personnel, and that such personnel 
shall not be considered “in any respect” unhcr staff members or as having any 
other contractual link with the Office. It is clear that by including these clauses 
in the implementing agreements with implementing partners, unhcr seeks to 
avoid responsibility for the conduct of these. Below, this responsibility will be 
analyzed in light of the rules of international responsibility.
3 Applying the Law of International Responsibility
A Generally on the System of International Responsibility
The law of international responsibility plays a fundamental role in the modern 
system of international law.72 It is understood as the body of principles which 
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Journal of International Law Online (2011); J. Aspremont and C. Ahlborn, ‘The International 
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of International Organizations’, ejil Talk, 16 May 2011; J. Alvarez, ‘Misadventures in 
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76 See A. Reinisch,‘The Immunity of International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of 
their Administrative Tribunals’, 7 Chinese Journal of International Law 285 (2008). See also 
Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, D.C. Cir., 1983. For an elaboration of how recent cases 
and academic commentary demonstrate a “nibbling away” at the edges of un immunity, 
determine when and how States and international organizations may be liable 
to another for breach of an international obligation. As such, the rules of inter-
national responsibility do not set forth any particular obligations but rather 
determine when an obligation has been breached and the legal consequences 
of that violation. The rules are as such “secondary” that address basic issues of 
responsibility and remedies available for breach of “primary” or substantive 
rules of international law. They establish the conditions for an act to qualify as 
internationally wrongful; the circumstances under which actions of officials 
and other actors may be attributed to the State or the international organiza-
tion; general defenses to liability; and the consequences of liability. Due to the 
historical primacy of States in the international legal system, the law of State 
responsibility is the most evolved structure of international responsibility.73
However, following a ten-year process, the International Law Commission 
adopted its Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
(ario) in the summer of 2011.74 The ilc’s efforts to develop the ario have 
been the subject of much critical commentary by states, international organi-
zations and scholars alike. The main criticisms have concerned the general 
lack of practice to support the contents of the ario rules and the ario’s 
resemblance to the ilc’s Articles on State Responsibility.75 In contrast to the 
latter, which referred to existing rules and largely codified customary interna-
tional law, the ario were drafted without extensive practice to draw from. This 
is largely due to the fact that because international organizations enjoy gener-
ous grants of immunity both as institutions and for their individual agents, 
there are few cases where principles of responsibility have been invoked before 
any national or international courts.76 As a result, while the ario codify some 
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principles of responsibility that are considered customary international law, 
the Articles also propose a number of more novel principles, and as the ilc 
recognizes in its Commentary: “[t]he fact that several of the present draft arti-
cles are based on limited practice moves the border between codification and 
progressive development in the direction of the latter.”77 While no interna-
tional judicial fora currently exists where international organizations can be 
held responsible under the ario, the ario have nevertheless been identified 
as a “critical new development”, the effects of which have already been seen in 
practice.78 Indeed, early drafts of ario were invoked by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ecthr) in the controversial Behrami case.79
B Applying the ario to unhcr
International responsibility is generally triggered following the decision that a 
breach of international law has occurred.80 Under the ario, for example, an 
organization is responsible for an internationally wrongful act when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the organization and 
which constitutes a breach of an international obligation.81 As will be explained 
below, the international obligations of unhcr may derive from treaty or cus-
tomary international law, and it is these obligations that determine what a 
breach of international law is under the law of international responsibility. As 
explained by the arbitral tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior case: “[t]he general 
principles of International Law concerning State responsibility are equally 
applicable in the case of breach of treaty obligation […] so that any violation 
of a State of any obligation, of whatever origin gives rise to State responsibil-
ity.”82 This, then, seems to imply that a State, or, as in this case, an international 
organization, which is in breach of any obligation to which it is bound under 
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international responsibility.
In addition to the provisions found in the specific legal conventions pertain-
ing to human rights and refugees, the most basic norms of international 
humanitarian and international human rights law are today considered part of 
international customary law.83 While most human rights treaties contain no 
provision for the accession of international organizations,84 there has been an 
increasing recognition that international customary law binds not only states, 
but also, by virtue of their legal personality, international organizations.85 In 
the Reparation for Injuries case, the icj found that the “ rights and duties [of 
the organization] will depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or 
implied in its constituent documents and functions in practice”.86 The icj’s 
most explicit reference to the obligations of international organizations can be 
found in its advisory opinion in the Interpretation of Agreement case, in which 
it explains that: “[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international 
law, and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under 
general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under interna-
tional agreements to which they are parties.”87 This means that unhcr is 
clearly bound by customary international (human rights) law.
unhcr’s subordination to the un Charter entails that Charter provisions 
requiring the un to respect human rights, including Articles 1(3), 55, and 56, 
also bind unhcr. unhcr’s mandate, found in the unhcr Statute,88 provides 
it with broader human rights obligations than the obligation to respect cus-
tomary human rights law.89 The Statute evidences that unhcr has been 
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granted a unique, almost supranational, role by the international community; 
it is specifically mandated to provide “international protection” to refugees and 
to seek “permanent solutions for the problem of refugees”.90 An integral link 
seems to exist between unhcr’s international protection mandate and human 
rights, and the Preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention aptly summarizes the 
grand objective of international protection: “to assure refugees the widest pos-
sible exercise of … fundamental rights and freedoms” which all “human beings 
[should] enjoy … without discrimination”. unhcr’s Statute arguably also binds 
the Agency to provide international protection not only in a passive sense, but 
also actively by for instance intervening vis-à-vis governments. As former High 
Commissioner Schnyder explained in 1965: “… international protection may be 
defined as the power, conferred by the international community to an interna-
tional body, to take all necessary measures to replace the national protection 
of which refugees are deprived, because of their very condition.”91 As such, 
international protection seems to a large extent based on the notion of surro-
gacy in which unhcr steps in to provide the protection which a refugee’s own 
State cannot or will not provide.92
C Attribution of Conduct by ngo Implementing Partners to unhcr
Under the ario, an international organization is responsible for an interna-
tionally wrongful act when conduct consisting of an action or omission is 
attributable to the organization and which constitutes a breach of an interna-
tional obligation.93 Article 6(1) of the ario specifically provides that: “[t]he 
conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the perfor-
mance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that 
organization under international law, whatever position the organ or agent 
holds in respect of the organization.” As detailed in the above, unhcr seeks to 
avoid liability for the conduct of its implementing partners by including cer-
tain clauses in its agreements with implementing partners. But do these agree-
ments hold water when analyzed through the lens of the ilc’s work on the 
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responsibility of international organizations? Under what circumstances 
should the acts and omissions of unhcr’s implementing partners be attrib-
uted to unhcr? The key questions appear to be whether or not these actors 
are to be considered unhcr “agents”, and whether or not they are perform-
ing  unhcr “functions”. It is precisely these issues that I will discuss below, 
before exploring the related issue of contractual clauses seeking to avoid 
responsibility.
1 unhcr “Agents” and Relation to unhcr “Functions”
The ilc defines the term “agent” as “an official or other person or entity, other 
than an organ, who is charged by the organization with carrying out, or helping 
to carry out, one of its functions, and thus through whom the organization 
acts”.94 It is arguable that this is precisely what unhcr’s implementing part-
ners do — through specific sub-contracting agreements, they are charged by 
unhcr to perform specific functions. Even though it is often referred to as a 
“partnership”, the relationship between unhcr and the ngo implementing 
partners is essentially an “unequal, contractor and service-provider relation-
ship”.95 Importantly, in drafting the definition of “agent”, the ilc relied on 
statements made by the International Court of Justice (icj) that advocated 
that the term must be understood “in the most liberal sense” and that the 
essence of the matter lies not in the agent’s administrative position, “but in the 
nature of their mission”.96
This broad understanding of the term “agent” in the ario has been criti-
cized by several international organizations. While unhcr does not appear 
to have submitted any comments regarding the ario to the ilc, interna-
tional  organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ilo), 
International Monetary Fund (imf) and the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (unesco) voiced concern that the wide 
inclusiveness of the key terms of Articles 2 and 6 may entail that conduct too 
easily can be attributed to international organizations.97 These organizations 
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suggested that it would be appropriate to add some qualifications to the defini-
tion of the term “agent”. The imf, for instance, considered that only acts of 
officials performed in their official capacity could be attributable to imf.98 In 
any manner, it is arguable that the mere existence of some sort of agreement 
between unhcr and an implementing partner should suffice for the establish-
ment of the agency link, primarily because such agreements generally confer 
power upon an entity to act “on behalf” of unhcr.99
The other decisive factor under the ario appears to be whether or not the 
implementing partner has been charged by unhcr with carrying out, or help-
ing to carry out, one of unhcr’s functions. Article 6(2) of the ario specifies 
that the “rules of the organization” shall apply in the determination of the 
functions of its organs and agents.100 The expression “rules of the organisation” 
in the ario means “the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions and 
other acts of the organisation adopted in accordance with those instruments 
and established practice of the organisation”.101 Through these rules, unhcr 
establishes which functions are entrusted to each organ and agent. The ilc 
Commentary particularly notes that the rules of the organization may include 
instruments such as agreements concluded by the organization with third par-
ties.102 In fact, given that the implementing agreements concluded by unhcr 
and its implementing partners allocate functions to unhcr agents in accor-
dance with the constituent instruments of the organization (the unhcr 
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Statute), it is arguable that these constitute one of the clearest forms of 
unhcr’s rules of the organization. Thus not only does the mere showing of 
a contractual link between unhcr and the implementing ngo suffice to 
qualify the ngo as a unhcr “agent”, the very fact that unhcr denotes these 
ngos as “implementing partners” indicates that these are, in fact, implement-
ing unhcr functions.
Accordingly, under Article 6, once it has been established that the ngo is a 
unhcr “agent”, there is no requirement to prove that unhcr effectively con-
trols each and every instance of conduct. Rather, attribution of conduct on the 
basis of this link encompasses all conduct of the agent in official capacity 
when this conduct amounts to an internationally wrongful act, even if this 
conduct happens to be in excess of authority or contravention of instructions. 
Importantly, when unhcr delegates certain of its functions to an implement-
ing ngo, the conduct of the sub-contractor, when this amounts to an interna-
tionally wrongful act, will be attributable to unhcr irrespective of whether or 
not unhcr’s mandate explicitly permits it to delegate these functions. As the 
ilc specifies, “[i]t may be held that, when practice develops in a way that is not 
consistent with the constituent instrument, the organization should not nec-
essarily be exempt from responsibility in the case of conduct that stretches 
beyond the organization’s competence.”103
2 Specifically on Contractual Clauses Seeking to Avoid 
Responsibility
In practice, many agreements concluded by unhcr and its ngo implement-
ing partners include clauses stipulating that the ngo will not be considered an 
agent or member of staff of the organization. As I explained in the above, 
unhcr’s model “Tripartite Sub-Project Agreement”, for instance, specifically 
stipulates that the implementing Agency shall be fully responsible for all ser-
vices performed by Agency personnel, and that such personnel “shall not be 
considered in any respect” unhcr staff members or as having any other con-
tractual link with the Office. unhcr is not alone in its attempts to avoid liabil-
ity for the conduct of those to whom it sub-contracts. During the ario drafting 
process, unesco expressed the opinion that attribution should be precluded 
when the relations between an international organization and a private con-
tractor are governed by a contract that includes a clause excluding the possibil-
ity that the contractor “be considered as an agent or member of the staff of 
unesco”. It specifically argued that:
66 Janmyr
journal of international humanitarian legal studies 5 (2014) 42-69
104 Footnotes omitted. ilc, (2006), supra note 97, sect. E at 11.
105 ilc, ibid., at 10f.
106 ilc, Seventh Report on Responsibility of International Organisations (prepared by 
G. Gaja, Special Rapporteur), A/CN.4/610, 27 March 2009.
107 Ibid.
unesco contractors may perform very different types of operational 
activities (including technical assistance) under fee contracts and con-
sultant contracts. Although the same types of activity could be carried 
out by unesco officials, in the case of contractors unesco is of the view 
that acts performed by the latter may not be considered as acts of the 
organization, since the rules of the organization clearly exclude this pos-
sibility. Furthermore, the contracts in question only impose on contrac-
tors an obligation of result (for instance, the execution of a project in 
the field), while the organization has no direction or control over their 
actions nor may it exercise disciplinary powers on them.104
According to unesco, the reason lies in the inclusion into such contracts of 
clauses according to which “[n]either the contractor, nor anyone whom the 
contractor employs to carry out the work is to be considered as an agent or 
member of the staff of unesco […].”105 Thus, in the view of unesco, despite 
sub-contracting functions to private actors, acts committed by these private 
actors would not be attributable to the Organization simply because the rules 
of the organization, i.e. the contract as such, would exclude the unesco from 
responsibility for wrongful acts of private actors acting on its account.
Responding to the unesco observations, the Special Rapporteur argued 
that:
In order to establish attribution when an international organization acts 
through a person or entity that is not an organ […] the decisive factor 
appears to be whether or not the person or entity has been charged by an 
organ of the international organization with carrying out, or helping to 
carry out, one of the functions of that organization.106
In his view, the practice of including clauses in contracts between interna-
tional organizations and private sub-contractors stipulating that the sub- 
contractor not be considered an agent or member of staff of the organization 
does not dispose of the question of attribution under international law.107 
Importantly, “this type of clause cannot exclude the possibility that, because of 
factual circumstances, the conduct of the private contractor would nevertheless 
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be attributed to the organization under international law.”108 It thus appears 
that, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, contractual clauses such as those pre-
sented above cannot result in any legal effect in the international legal order. 
While such clauses may be seen as significant in terms of the internal legal 
order of an international organization, from an international law perspective, 
they may be seen as irrelevant. As scholars such as Verdirame have noted, seen 
from the perspective of advancing un accountability, the solution adopted by 
the ilc is wholly appropriate.109
D Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
Attribution of conduct does not always entail an engagement of responsibility. 
The international law of responsibility has developed a system of “defenses” 
for violations of the law, known as circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 
Accordingly, if a defense is successfully relied upon by unhcr, the conduct in 
question is no longer wrongful in character. Articles 20–27 of the ario, con-
taining defences of consent, self-defence, countermeasures, force majeure, dis-
tress, necessity and compliance with peremptory norms, draw largely on the 
corresponding articles on State responsibility.110 Perhaps the most frequently 
invoked defence with regard to international organizations is force majeure, 
which relates to the “occurrence of an irresistible force or an unforeseeable 
event, beyond the control of the organization”.111 This would basically mean 
that in circumstances where it would be materially impossible for unhcr to 
perform a certain obligation, the Organization may be precluded from wrong-
fulness under these limited conditions. However, it could be argued that the 
threshold for a successful invocation of force majeure with regard to an organi-
zation such as unhcr is higher due to the very nature of unhcr’s work in 
emergencies and in the context of other unforeseen events. Indeed, it appears 
only reasonable that unhcr is expected to do all in its power to prevent 
human rights violations in its operations.
 Concluding Remarks: Towards New Implementing Partnerships
This article has argued that acts and omissions of unhcr’s implementing 
partners may be attributable to unhcr under ario Article 6 and may as such 
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incur the international responsibility of unhcr for violations of international 
human rights law. unhcr is currently reviewing its framework for implement-
ing with partners, and this offers a unique opportunity for unhcr to modify its 
agreements to reflect recent legal developments and to clarify its relationship 
with these ngos.112 According to a recent status update regarding the new 
framework, future agreements will include a requirement that all actors com-
mit to humanitarian principles, non-discrimination of refugees and other per-
sons of concern, respect unhcr’s mandate, and, interestingly, compliance 
with the un Security Council’s resolutions relating to terrorism and in particu-
lar the financing of terrorism.113 This is indeed one step forward, but the 
prospect of being internationally responsible for certain conduct of its imple-
menting partners should induce unhcr to even closer clarify obligations and 
responsibilities. This article contends that there is an immediate need for 
unhcr to ensure that any contract entered into clarifies the real nature of the 
link existing between the parties and explicitly defines the respective roles and 
responsibilities of unhcr and the implementing partner. Future agreements 
specifically need to clarify both the international human rights standards and 
internal unhcr standards by which unhcr’s implementing partners need to 
abide. Considering the vast amount of unhcr directives, guidelines and hand-
books available, and considering how the implementing agreement is formu-
lated today, it seems difficult for unhcr’s implementing partners to fully 
comprehend to which rules they are bound.
The impact of the ario may also be evident in unhcr’s selection and 
administration of its implementing partners. unhcr’s new framework for 
implementing with partners establishes an Implementing Partner Management 
Service, in addition to a relatively new July 2013 Policy on Selection and 
Retention of Partners.114 unhcr has previously acknowledged that its imple-
menting arrangements have “largely evolved as a result of trial and error”,115 
and its attempts to come to terms with flaws in the implementing arrange-
ments were in 2010 criticized by un oios. In 2010, it issued a report on unhcr’s 
relationship with its implementing partners, with the objective to “assess 
the adequacy of unhcr's policies for the establishment of an effective 
and efficient partnership with ips”.116 Concluding that the “management and 
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monitoring of relationships with implementing partners need to be improved”, 
the Report specifically found that, despite the fact that 12 evaluations of part-
nerships with ngos had been conducted by unhcr between 1994 and 2007, 
there was generally an absence of mechanisms to collect and disseminate 
information on unhcr’s relationship with its implementing partners.117
The solution provided by the ario highlights the importance of regulating 
the conduct of unhcr’s implementing partners more closely and establishing 
procedural guidelines for the follow-up of cases of misconduct and the reper-
cussions to follow if the implementing partner commits or is alleged to have 
committed an act amounting to an internationally wrongful act. Implementing 
agreements should thus also include rights of access for unhcr oversight bod-
ies and provisions for monitoring of conduct as well as the follow up of identi-
fied misconduct. unhcr’s Inspector General’s Office (igo) has long lacked 
authority to investigate unhcr’s implementing partners suspected of miscon-
duct and unhcr has not had any mechanism for ensuring that the imple-
menting partners who have not performed are excluded from future 
agreements.118 Consequently, cases of misconduct by unhcr’s implementing 
partners brought to the attention of igo have often been referred to the imple-
menting partner’s headquarters. As stated by unhcr at the Pre-Excom 
Consultations with ngos in 2003, unhcr “investigates allegations against its 
staff and accepts that it is the ngo’s responsibility to investigate complaints 
with respect to their own employees”.119 If we accept that unhcr is responsi-
ble for the conduct of its sub-contractors, it should rather strengthen its super-
visory mechanisms accordingly.
